Florida Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 2

Article 1

June 1961

The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida
John M. Starling

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John M. Starling, The Tenancy by the Entireties in Florida, 14 Fla. L. Rev. 111 (1961).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

The Tenancy by
the Entireties
in Florida
University Starling:
of Florida
Law
Review
VOL. XIV

SUMMER

1961

No. 2

THE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
IN FLORIDA-v
JOHN M. STARLING"*

The estate by the entireties, deeply rooted in feudal concepts of
the marital relationship, continues to thrive in the State of Florida.
Drawing its substance from notions of community property, the
tenancy has proved a trap for the unwary, a blessing for surviving
spouses, a curse to heirs and creditors, and a source of endless litigation.
Briefly stated, an estate by the entireties is created when property
is taken in the names of husband and wife.1 Sometimes the intent
to create such a tenancy must be shown.2 Property so held cannot
be encumbered, leased, or conveyed without the joint consent of
husband and wife. 3 The surviving tenant becomes the sole owner of
entireties property; hence the property is not administered as a part
of the estate of the deceased tenant. 4 Individual creditors of husband
or wife cannot levy on the property, although execution is allowed for
the joint debts of the couple.5
This article is concerned with problems arising from the incidents of the estate, with the rights of third parties in transactions in
connection with such property, and with the creation and termination
of the estate. The federal tax impacts of the tenancy, the effect of
Florida's homestead provisions, utilization of the tenancy in estate
planning, and title opinion problems will receive brief consideration.
* A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
**B.SJ. 1953, LL.B. 1961, University of Florida.
1. E.g., Knapp v. Fredricksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So. 2d 251 (1941); Dixon v.
Becker, 134 Fla. 547, 184 So. 114 (1938); English v. English, 66 Fla. 427, 63 So.
822 (1913).
2. E.g., Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); In re Lyons' Estate, 90
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956); Tingle v. Hornsby, 111 So. 2d 274 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
3. E.g., Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So. 2d 80 (1946); Richardson v.
Grill, 138 Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939); Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So.
843 (1936). But spouses have been allowed to exercise unilateral control over
tenancies composed of personal property. See notes 202-203 infra.
4. E.g., Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953);
Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938); Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106
Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
5. E.g., Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936); Hart v. Atwood, 96
Fla. 667, 119 So. 116 (1928); Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So.
376 (1920).
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TENANCY

The English Origin
Estates by the entireties, predicated upon now quaint ideas of the
status of married women, originated in the English common law as
early as the fourteenth century~A The tenancy was based upon a legal
fiction that husband and wife are one and that therefore there is
but one estate, with the husband-wife entity owning the whole.7 At
common law a wife could not own personal property and was not entitled to her earnings from her personal labor.8 The husband was
entitled to a freehold estate in all of the property owned by the wife
at marriage and also in that later conveyed or devised to her., Because of these disabilities, it has been said that the early English
judges could not bring themselves to give the wife the status of a
joint tenant or a tenant in common; as a result there evolved the
doctrine of the tenancy by the entireties, with its concept of "oneness. "10 The estate as it existed at common law lacked many of the
incidents that accompany the tenancy today. For example, the husband alone could convey the property, subject to the wife's indestructible right of survivorship, his individual creditors could levy upon
the estate; and the tenancy could not exist in personal property."'
Absorption into the Law of Florida
Surprisingly, until 1913 the Supreme Court of Florida did not have
occasion to decide whether an estate by the entireties could be created
in this state. The Court first recognized the tenancy in English v.

English 2 by holding that a conveyance to a third party by a husband,
with a reconveyance to husband and wife, creates an estate by the
entireties. The Court did not dwell at length upon the wisdom
of recognizing the estate in Florida. In a mechanical manner it
pointed out that the common law recognized such an estate, that
Florida had adopted the common law except as modified by statute, 3
6. See 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §1803 (1940); Ritter, A Criticism of the
Estate by the Entirety, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 153, 154 (1952).
7. Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936); Bailey v. Smith, 89
Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
8. See Omwake v. Omwake, 70 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1954); Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 16 So. 2d 158 (1944); Blood v. Hunt, 97 Fla. 551, 121 So. 886
(1929); 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife §21 (1944).

9. See note 8 supra.
10. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 155.
11. Id. at 154-55. But see Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925)
(citing cases for the proposition that a tenancy by the entireties existed in
personal property at common law).
12. 66 Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913).
13.

FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1959).
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that in its opinion the statutes abrogating the right of survivorship
in joint tenancy 14 and creating separate property rights of married
women- had not changed the common law, and that hence the estate
still existed in Florida.
Recognition of the tenancy in Florida has drawn severe criticism,
primarily on the bases that there was no reason to embrace the estate,
since married women can now hold property, and that the doctrine is
archaic and repugnant to modern ideas of the status of married
women.'0 It has also been pointed out that the majority of the states
7
have refused to recognize the tenancy.
In the English case the Florida Court enunciated the following
incidents of the tenancy: Upon the death of one spouse the survivor
takes all of the estate, though not as a new estate; both spouses
must assent to alienation of the estate; and there can be no partition
of the lands during the joint lives of the spouses.
Later decisions established that judgment creditors of one of the
spouses cannot levy upon property held by the entireties.1s Recognition that the estate can also exist in personal property followed a
short time later.' 9
In the past forty-seven years many cases involving the tenancy
have been considered by Florida courts. The result has been the
formulation of a body of law sui generis to the tenancy by the entireties. It behooves the Florida practitioner to grasp the import of
these decisions, since they have and will continue to upset the planning of an estate and to frustrate or delight spouses, heirs, vendees,
and creditors.
CREATION OF THE ESTATE IN FLORIDA
The Common Law Unities
An analysis of the so-called unities necessary to the existence of

jointly-held estates clarifies the differences between the estate by the
14. FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1959). The statute was enacted originally on Nov.
17, 1829. Cosstp. GEN. LAWS ANN. §5482 (1927). The statute was amended in
1941 to expressly exempt estates by the entireties from its operation. Fla. Laws
1941, ch. 20954, §3.
15. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, §1; FLA. STAT. §708.02 (1959) (enacted originally
in 1845). Both provide that the property of a married woman shall be her
separate property.
16. See Ritter, supra note 6, at 158-59.
17. See 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY §1806 (1940); Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties,25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951).
18. E.g., State ex rel. Molter v. Johnson, 107 Fla. 47, 144 So. 299 (1932); Hart
v. Atwood, 96 Fla. 667, 119 So. 116 (1928); Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79
Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
19. E.g., Rader v. First Natl Bank, 42 So. 2d I (Fla. 1949); Lindsley v. Phare,
115 Fla. 454, 155 So. 812 (1934); Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
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entireties and other jointly-held estates. The one distinguishing
feature of an estate in common is unity of possession by the cotenants. 20 Joint tenancy contemplates three additional unities: The
interests of the co-tenants in the property must be the same; their
interests must originate in the same conveyance or by the same
instrument; and their interests must commence simultaneously. 1 A
tenancy by the entireties contemplates the four unities of joint
tenancy and the additional unity of person springing from the relationship of husband and wife. 22 The singleness of person is traceable
to the common law conception of man and wife as one person. The
23
Florida Court has thus described the estate:
"It is a peculiar and anomalous estate. It is a sui generis
species of tenancy. The essential characteristic of an estate by
the entirety is that each spouse is seized of the whole or the
entirety, and not of a share, moiety, or divisible part ...
There is but one estate, and, in contemplation of law, it is
held by but one person."
Since the marital relationship is essential to the creation of a
tenancy by the entireties, a deed to husband and wife fails to create
such a tenancy when the marriage is bigamous. 24 When an instrument purports to create an estate by the entireties between mother
and daughter, the conveyance results only in a tenancy in common,
with a right of survivorship and an agreement not to partition.25
Rule of Constructionor Rule of Law?
Many Florida cases hold in effect that when land is conveyed to
husband and wife an estate by the entireties is created unless the
conveyance reveals a contrary intent.26 The Florida Court has said
that a limitation of property conveyed to husband and wife without
specifying their property interests is construed to limit it to them
by the entireties, and that in order to create the tenancy it is not
necessary that the grantees be referred to as husband and wife or
that their matrimonial relationship be mentioned in the deed.27
20. Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So. 2d 205 (1945).
21. Ibid.; Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 514, 189 So. 666, 668 (1939)
.(dissenting opinion).
22. Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So. 2d 205 (1945).
23. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 305, 103 So. 833, 834 (1925).
24. Nottingham v. Denison, 63 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1953); Kerivan v. Fogal, 156
Fla. 92, 22 So. 2d 584 (1945).
25. Forehand v. Peacock, 77 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1955).
26. E.g., Knapp v. Fredericksen, 148 Fla. 311, 4 So. 2d 251 (1941); Ohio
Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); English v. English, 66
Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913).
27. American Central Ins. Co. v. 'Whitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936)
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But the Court has also recognized the application of a rule of
28
construction, as exemplified by this statement in Bailey v. Smith:
"[Wihether such an estate [by the entireties] exists as a result
of the acquisition of property by and in the names of both
husband and wife must be .determined by a consideration of
the nature and terms of the transaction as portraying the intent of the parties and of the rules of law applicable thereto."
There are numerous Florida cases that deal with the question
whether an estate by the entireties has been created. The total impression of these cases is a welter of conflicting rulings. One case
announces the creation of a tenancy by the entireties as a rule of
law, and the next is decided upon the presumption that the spouses
intended to create the tenancy. The results are more consistent if
viewed in the light of three overlapping factual situations:
(1) Does the question of the existence of an estate by the
entireties arise upon the death of one of the spouses or in a
"living" setting, such as divorce?
(2) Is the purported estate by the entireties composed of
real or personal property?
(3) Did the husband or the wife furnish the consideration
for the purchase of the property?
Real Property. Initially, it may be said that if husband and wife
acquire non-homestead real estate in their joint names the survivor
will become the sole owner of the property in the absence of a
fraudulent conveyance. -9 In this situation the Florida Court follows
a rule of law in determining that a tenancy by the entireties exists.
No concern is expressed over whether one of the spouses contributed
more to the estate than the other. Existence of an intent to create
the tenancy in real estate can, however, become an issue in a living
termination of the estate.20
Personal Property. Florida recognizes a tenancy by the entireties
in promissory notes, 31 mortgages,32 partnerships, 3 bonds,' 1 bank ac(personalty, dictum as to realty).
28. 89 Fla. 303, 308, 103 So. 833, 835 (1925) (rule of law applied, however).
29. E.g., cases cited note 26 supra.
30. Hargett v. Hargett, 156 Fla. 730, 24 So. 2d 305 (1946).
31. Merrill v. Adkins, 131 Fla. 478, 180 So. 41 (1938); American Central Ins.
Co. v. Vhitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1936); Lindsley v. Phare, 115 Fla. 454,
155 So. 812 (1934).
32. Powell v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952); Lindsley v. Phare, supra note
31; Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
33. Lacker v. Zuern, 109 So. 2d 180 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).

34. See In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956).
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counts and savings deposits, 35 corporate stock, 36 and other intangible
rights, such as beverage licenses. 3 7 The Florida judiciary has vacillated in formulating the requirements for creation of the tenancy in
personalty. When the Supreme Court first recognized creation of
the tenancy in personal property, the only requisite was that the
property be in the names of husband and wife, although at the same
time it intimated that the intent of the parties should be considered. 38
Florida courts have subsequently demanded evidence of intent to
create the estate beyond the mere execution of an instrument in the
39
names of the spouses.
The greatest area of difficulty has been in determining whether
the estate was created in bank accounts. Confusion with cases involving joint bank accounts, together with the Court's concern over
evasion of testamentary requirements, tracing of proceeds, and lack
of unity of control by the spouses, has clouded the requirements for
establishing a tenancy by the entireties in bank accounts.
In the first Florida case involving bank accounts of spouses the
Court sustained a tenancy by the entireties by looking solely at the
deposit agreement authorizing payment to husband and wife. 40 Later
cases followed a rule of law in upholding the tenancy upon a mere
showing of a joint deposit agreement, 41 even when the deposit contract made the account payable to either of the spouses or to the
survivor. 42 In Hagerty v. Hagerty43 the Court said that the fact that
either spouse could unilaterally sever the estate was not significant,
that the deposit slip merely made each spouse the agent of the other,
and that upon an agency theory each spouse still had control of the
account. The Court stated that there was no need to concern itself
with the requirements of an inter vivos gift, such as surrender of
dominion over the gift to the donee-spouse. It reasoned that no
35. Rader v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1949); Bailey v. Smith,
supra note 32; Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1959).
36. See Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 157 Fla. 300, 25 So. 2d 859 (1946); Lerner
v. Lerner, supra note 35.
37. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 113 So. 2d 412 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
38. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
39. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d
39 (Fla. 1956); Lerner v. Lerner, supra note 35; Tingle v. Hornsby, 111 So. 2d 274
(1st D.CA. Fla. 1959). See Doing v. Riley, 176 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1949), in which
the court said that although tenancy by the entireties can exist in personal property, no court decision or Florida statute prescribes the procedure by which such
an estate can be created.
40. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
41. Colclazier v. Colclazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956); Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52
So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951); Rader v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 So. 2d I (Fla. 1949).
42. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
43. Ibid.
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estate by the entireties would be possible in bank accounts if complete control over the account were given the donee, because the
donor-spouse also has to retain dominion over entireties property.
The Court stated further that bank deposits are particularly suitable
for a tenancy by the entireties because of the unities of possession, interest, and person peculiar to a joint bank deposit.
A new doctrine was enunciated in 1955 in the case of In re Lyons'
Estate.4" There were two bank accounts, both payable to husband or
wife, but only one of them contained words of survivorship. The wife
had never withdrawn funds from or deposited money in either account. The Court at first held that the bank account with words of
survivorship qualified as an estate by the entireties but that the one
lacking a survivorship provision did not. On rehearing, 4 the Court
held that neither deposit created an estate by the entireties. The
Court said that there must be a clear showing of an intent to create
the estate in bank deposits and condoned the use of extrinsic evidence to establish the intent of the donor. The husband-donor had
struck the name of the wife from one of the deposit agreements
before his death; the other account had been terminated by the
husband, who had placed the proceeds in another account in his sole
name. The Court could have predicated its decision upon the theory
that the tenancy had been terminated by the husband acting within
his agency. But under its prior rulings the Court would have had to
allow the wife to trace the proceeds of the unilateral severance without her consent; as a result it was held that no tenancy by the entireties was ever created.
Winters v. Parks" also involved the tracing of proceeds of a bank
account. The Court said that the wording of the deposit agreement "Mr. or Mrs. . . .Joint Account with Right of Survivorship" - was
sufficient to establish an intent to give the survivor the funds remaining in the account upon the death of the donor-spouse, but that an
estate by the entireties was not created. Extrinsic evidence of intent
was again allowed. The donor had consistently dealt with the bank
account as his own; the donee-spouse had written only a few checks
on the account over a period of twelve years; and the donee-spouse
was listed on the account only as a matter of convenience. The Court
said that when the deposit agreement does not clearly indicate that
the spouses intend to hold by the entireties, all of the facts leading
up to and subsequent to creation of the account become relevant. A
later case 47 upheld a tenancy by the entireties in a bank account, distinguishing In re Lyons' Estate and Winters v. Parks on the basis
44. 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956).
45. Id. at 43.
46. 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956).
47. Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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that the wife was shown to have contributed some of her own funds
to the account.
The foregoing cases have been criticized as being inconsistent
with the earlier Florida rulings. 4 8 It should be noted, however, that
the cases are consistent if the ultimate question is whether the
donee-spouse shall be allowed to trace the money transferred from
the account by the donor-spouse during his life. The earlier cases
involved the issue of who was to take the funds remaining in the
account upon the death of the donor; 49 in Winters v. Parks and In
re Lyons' Estate the wife attempted to trace the proceeds following
a unilateral severance of the account by the husband.
If the Court rules that a tenancy by the entireties has been created
in a joint bank account, each spouse lacks the power to make gratuitous inter vivos transfers from the account. Apparently this would
give the surviving spouse a golden opportunity to attack such transfers by the deceased, no matter how long a period of time had elapsed
since the transfer. The courts have both allowed-0 and denied '
the surviving spouse the right to trace such inter vivos transfers from
personal property held by the entireties. The easy way out of this
dilemma is for the court to hold that although the bank account
creates a joint estate with rights of survivorship, no tenancy by the
entireties arises. This gives the surviving tenant the right to claim
funds remaining in the account but avoids the inevitable tracing
problems that accompany a holding that an estate by the entireties
was created. Of course, as the Supreme Court said in Winters v. Parks,
a clear showing of an intent to create the tenancy will be recognized;
but rubber stamp impressions on bank deposit agreements will not
be sufficient.
Since tenancies by the entireties in bank accounts are similar to
bank accounts held as joint tenancies, the Court may apply to husband-wife deposits the recent stringent requirements enunciated for
joint tenancies. In Chase Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Sullivan 48. Brooker, Survivorship in Joint Bank Accounts, 31 FLA. B.J. 183 (1957).
49. Cases cited note 41 supra.
50. Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
51. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956); In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d
39 (Fla. 1956).
52. 127 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1960). The requirements of FIA. STAT. §689.15 (1959)
must be met to establish survivorship in joint bank accounts except in estates
by the entireties. It provides that there will be no survivorship rights unless the
instrument creating the estate expressly so provides. Id. §659.29 frees the bank
from liability if it pays the survivor of an account that is payable to either depositor or payable to either or the survivor. This statute establishes survivorship
as between the bank and the surviving tenant but does not establish ownership
of the account. Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1956). Brooker, supra note 48,
points out that the statute allows the surviving tenant to take the account when
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the Florida Court announced that an inter vivos gift or trust 53 is a
condition precedent to recognition of a joint bank account. Hence,
the elements of an inter vivos gift - donative intent, delivery of a
present interest in the res, and acceptance by the donee -must be
present to some extent in order to sustain a joint bank account. The
deposit agreement in Sullivan clearly showed that the depositor intended for the other party to receive the proceeds upon her death.
This agreement, said the Court, gave rise to a presumption that she
intended that the donee should have a present, equal right to withdraw the money. But extrinsic evidence clearly rebutted this presumption. Since the evidence revealed that the depositor intended
the donee to have an interest in the account only upon her death,
the Court held that the gift was void for failure to comply with
the Statute of Wills.
It is uncertain whether the Court will extend the requirements
of the Sullivan case to estates by the entireties in bank accounts.
The Court cited Hagerty v. Hagerty for the proposition that each of
the parties must have an equal right to withdraw the funds. But in
the Hagerty case the Court did not require any showing of an inter
vivos gift. It can be reasoned that in Hagerty the presumption of a
present gift stood unrebutted because of lack of evidence showing
testamentary intent.
As policy reasons for the Sullivan decision, the Court said that
a contrary holding would defeat the claims of those entitled to
priority over testamentary beneficiaries, including the rights of
creditors and those of widows to dower. These reasons are not persuasive when applied to a husband-wife bank account, since a widow's
interest would be best protected by a finding that the account was
held by the entireties, and creditors' interests can be amply protected
under the law of fraudulent conveyances. From a policy standpoint,
therefore, the Sullivan case should not be applied to husband-wife
he may not be entitled to it and that if the tenant squanders the money, the
heirs or others entitled to the account will have a naked remedy.
53. Florida recognized the "Totten Trust" in Seymour v. Seymour, 85 So. 2d
726 (Fla. 1956), in which an account was established by a depositor in trust for
her son. The depositor subsequently added to and withdrew from the savings
account. The Court described the trust as tentative, revocable at will by the
depositor until he dies or completes the gift by delivery of the passbook or notice
to the beneficiary. FLA. STAT. §659.30 (1959) frees the bank from liability for
paying the stated beneficiary after the death of the "trustee," but it is not
determinative of ownership of the property. Seymour v. Seymour, id. See Webster v. St. Petersburg Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 155 Fla. 412, 20 So. 2d 400 (1945),
in which the Court discusses four theories upon which a joint tenancy with right
of survivorship can be sustained: (1) trust, (2) joint tenancy under FLA. STAT.
§689.15, (3) completed gift, and (4) contract between depositor and bank, with
the donee as a third party beneficiary.
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bank accounts when the issue is ownership of the funds remaining in
54
the account after one spouse dies.
Other reasons why the Court differentiates between real and personal property are apparent. A person purchasing real estate or receiving it as a gift from one of the spouses is charged with notice
of the interest of the other spouse, since the interest is expressly set
out in the chain of title. This is not true in regard to personal
property.
Further, the placing of real property in the names of the spouses
is a living act. Their interests are fixed at that time. But bank deposits vary; each depositor has the power to deplenish the account.
Thus the allowing of estates by the entireties in bank accounts results in one more inroad upon the Statute of Wills. If the tenancy
is recognized, tracing problems will occur, and the entire estate of
a deceased may be disposed of without compliance with testamentary
requirements.
Husband as Donor. A distinction between whether the claimant
is husband or wife becomes exceedingly important in a living termination of the estate, as by divorce. In situations of this nature the
Florida Supreme Court follows a rule of construction, even as to
the existence of a tenancy by the entireties in real property. 5 The
Court uses traditional gift doctrine in the event of a living termination of the estate. One theory is that when a husband places property
in the names of his wife and himself he intends to make a gift to
his wife. 50 This presumption can be rebutted only by a showing of
57
conclusive evidence to the contrary.
When property held by the entireties is sold and the husband is
allowed to take the proceeds without protest from the wife, she cannot trace the proceeds upon divorce, since her acquiescence rebuts
the presumption of an intent to create an estate by the entireties. 8
In Strauss v. Strauss-9 the Florida Supreme Court reversed a chancellor's order that the wife convey to the husband her interest in
property held in their joint names, saying that even if the presump54. Nor should the bank account be denied the status of an estate by the
entireties through evidence aliunde of a lack of donative intent. Intent to create
a joint tenancy was allowed to be rebutted in Spark v. Canny, 88 So. 2d 307 (Fla.
1956). Unlike other instances of joint tenancies, when the wife is the donee
there is a strong presumption of a gift.
55. E.g., Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1958); Fuller v. Fuller, 38 So.
2d 51 (Fla. 1948); Hargett v. Hargett, 156 Fla. 730, 24 So. 2d 305 (1946).
56. Hargett v. Hargett, supra note 55; Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So.
2d 727 (1941).
57. Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941).
58. Fuller v. Fuller, 38 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1948).
59. 148 Fla. 23, 3 So. 2d 727 (1941).
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tion of a gift to the wife is overcome, the wife can establish a special
equity in the property through the contribution of services to the
family's welfare and comfort over a period of years. By way of
explanation the Court noted the virtues of the doctrine of community property as it exists in the Southwest and stated that it will
force an equal division of property accumulated during coverture
when the circumstances so warrant. It noted further that the labor,
pain, and drudgery required of the wife and mother in sustaining
the home and giving birth to and caring for the children often more
than offset the contribution of the father to the family budget.
In another instance a husband who had conveyed a one-half undivided interest in his property to his wife shortly after marriage failed
to rebut the presumption of a gift by showing that the wife stayed
with him only five or six days and that hence the consideration for the
transfer failed. 0 When a husband owns property outright but upon
selling it has the mortgage made payable to him and his wife, he
cannot avoid the presumption of a valid gift by claiming that the
wife's name was placed on the mortgage through inadvertence.6'
A husband's argument in a divorce proceeding, and after his
death the argument of the guardian of his minor child, that the
placing of the property in the wife's and the husband's names was
a gift conditioned upon the marital behavior of the wife was rejected,62 though the equities were strongly in favor of the husband
and the child. The chancellor had refused to award custody of the
child to the mother after the death of the father and had held that
the gift was on a condition subsequent. In reversing the chancellor
the Florida Supreme Court said that the situation was the typical one
in which the behavior of one of the spouses deteriorated over a period
of time without any preconceived plan to that end, and that the subsequent misconduct could not be visited back upon a transaction
growing out of a presumptive voluntary gift motivated by the affection of the husband for his wife. The Court stated that adoption
of the condition subsequent rationale would come dangerously close
to announcing that an estate by the entireties has no efficacy until
death places the entire interest in the estate in the survivor, because
until then it would not be definitely known whether the marriage
had been successful.
Wife as Donor. When a wife contributes money to the acquisition
of property taken in the joint names of husband and wife, a different
rule applies. In this situation Florida adopts the traditional view
that the wife intended to make a loan, not a gift, and that the hus60. Ray v. Ray, 44 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1950).
61. Powell v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952).
62. Copeland v. Copeland, 65 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1953).
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band holds the property for her benefit in a resulting trust.6 3 The
reasons for this view are said to be the confidential relationship involved64 and the legal doctrine that a wife has no obligation to support her husband. 65 If the husband is the claimant, he has to prove
that there was a bona fide gift in order to overcome the presumption of a resulting trust; 66 and evidence of an intention to make a gift
67
must be clear and convincing.
The dichotomy that the creation of a tenancy by the entireties
depends upon who paid the purchase price of the property is one
of the more illogical doctrines in this area. It seems unfair and unrealistic to tell a husband that when he acquires property in his and
his wife's names he has made a gift to his wife and on the other
hand to tell the wife that she can put her property in their joint
names but that really this act has no legal significance, since the
law presumes that she intends her husband to hold the property in
trust for her.
From the foregoing it appears that Florida follows a rule of law
that allows the surviving spouse to take the entire interest in real
property held in their joint names.6 8 Extrinsic evidence is not
allowed to vary the terms of the deed creating the tenancy. But real
property in the names of the spouses may be held not to be an
estate by the entireties in divorce proceedings or when a creditor
is attempting to levy upon the estate. The Florida Supreme Court
generally follows a rule of construction in both "living" and "death"
situations when personal property, especially bank accounts, is in63. E.g., Faris v. Williams, 154 Fla. 6, 16 So. 2d 293 (1944); Allen v. Allen,
123 So. 2d 355 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960). But see Walton v. Walton, 155 Fla. 573,
20 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1945) (semble); Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207
(1941). Before the presumption of a resulting trust arises the fact that the wife's
separate funds were used in acquiring the property must be established. In
Foster v. Thornton, 131 Fla. 277, 179 So. 882 (1938), the Court fixed the quantum
of proof as beyond a reasonable doubt. This case, however, involved a creditor
of the husband, who had transferred his property to the wife pending suit.
64. See Allen v. Allen, 123 So. 2d 355 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
65. See Pyle v. Pyle, 53 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1951).
66. Forde v. Forde, 152 Fla. 142, 10 So. 2d 919 (1942); Allen v. Allen, supra
note 64.
67. Forde v. Forde, supra note 66.
68. It may be possible, although doubtful, that heirs of the wife could
attack the surviving husband's interest if the wife supplied the consideration for
the purchase of the land. Cf. Pyle v. Pyle, supra note 65. The Pyle case involved
a situation in which the wife, who supplied the consideration, was held to state
a cause of action in a suit to impress a resulting trust upon property acquired
by the deceased husband in his sole name. The case did not involve an estate
by the entireties; and it was the surviving spouse, not the heirs, who was claiming
that the property was held in a resulting trust.
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volved. In all cases in which the intent of the parties is allowed to
be shown by extrinsic evidence, a presumption of gift to the wife, or
of resulting trust in her favor if she supplied the consideration, must
be rebutted.
Creation by Implication
Property held in the sole name of one of the spouses has been
adjudicated to be a tenancy by the entireties. 69 If the spouses contract in their joint names to acquire property from third parties and
the husband takes a conveyance in his name alone, the chancellor
can rule that the property is held by the entireties, since there is
inferred from the contract of sale an intent that the deed should be
executed in the names of husband and wife.y0 Estates by the entireties may arise in property in the names of third persons when the
property was purchased with assets obtained from the sale of entireties properties. In White v. White,71 jointly-owned property of husband and wife was used to purchase property in the sole name of a
stepson. In a suit by the wife for separate maintenance the stepson was
ordered to convey to the husband and wife, on the theory of resulting
trust. Similarly, shares of corporate stock taken in exchange by the
husband for property held by the entireties and given by him to a
third person can be claimed by his wife after his death7 2 An estate
by the entireties may be implied if a husband designates himself and
his wife as vendors in a contract for sale of his sole property. 73
The Necessary Words
Traditionally, estates by the entireties in real property are created
by deeding the land to husband and wife. If the necessary unities
are present, 74 including the fact that John and Mary Doe are legally
married75 an estate by the entireties is created, even if the marital
relationship is not mentioned in the deed76
Since an estate by the entireties is predicated upon the theory
that each spouse has absolute control over the entire estate, a difficult
problem is presented when property is held in the name of husband
or wife. This gives each spouse the ability to deal with the property
without the consent of the other. The husband-or-wife situation
69. Picchi v. Picchi, 100 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1958).
70. Ibid.

71. 42 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1949).
72. Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (conversion of
joint bank account).
73. Tingle v. Hornsby, 111 So. 2d 274 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
74. See text at notes 20-22 supra.
75. See text at notes 24-25 supra.
76. See text at note 27 supra.
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usually arises in connection with bank accounts and savings deposits.
A bank has no authority to pay one of the spouses alone if the deposit is in the names of husband and wife, 77 but if the deposit slip
reads husband or wife the bank can pay upon the order of either.78
Massachusetts refuses to recognize a tenancy by the entireties if the
deposit is in the disjunctive, since unilateral control is repugnant to
the underlying theory of unity of control of the estate.70 Pennsylvaniaso and Florida,"' however, allow a husband-or-wife deposit to
be held by the entireties, but the Court will resort to extrinsic evidence of the intent of the depositor.82 The disjunctive deposits are
sustained on the theory that each spouse by the terms of the deposit
has given the other express authority to represent both in making
withdrawals from the account.83
Statutory Creation
A problem arises when a husband owning property in severalty
desires to convert it into property held by the entireties. Should he
convey the fee to the wife, with an express provision that he intends
to create an estate by the entireties? Or should he convey an undivided one-half interest to the wife? Or should he convey to a third
person and take a conveyance back to himself and his wife as tenants
by the entireties?
Section 689.11 of the Florida statutes was amended in 1947 to
provide that "an estate by the entirety may be created by the spouse
holding fee simple title conveying to the other by a deed in which
the purpose to create such estate is stated." The statute was enacted
after affirmance in 1939 by an equally divided Supreme Court of a
lower court's holding that a conveyance of non-homestead property by
a husband to his wife and himself sufficed to create an estate by the
entireties and void a subsequent devise of the same property by the
husband to his son.8 4 The three justices approving the lower court's
order said that the deed in legal effect conveyed to the wife and reserved to the husband, even though there was no express mention in
the deed of an intent to create an estate by the entireties. These
77. Milano v. Fayette Title & Trust Co., 96 Pa. Super. 310 (1929). But see
Bello v. Union Trust Co., 267 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1959); Gerson v. Broward Co.
Title Co., 116 So. 2d 455 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
78. FLA. STAT. §659.29 (1959).
79. Marble v. Treasurer, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N.E. 442 (1923).
80. Madden v. Gosztonyi Say. & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 At. 624 (1938).
81. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
82. In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1956).
83. Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
84. Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939); see Note, I U.
FLA. L. REV. 433 (1948).
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justices thought that the deed afforded the five requisite unities of
interest, title, time, possession, and husband and wife. The affirming
opinion could have utilized the theory that the conveyance was to the
legal unity of the husband and his wife. The other three justices
registered a strong dissent,85 saying that one person could not occupy
at one time the position of both grantor and grantee in regard to
the same property. The dissenters felt that the legal effect of such
a deed should be to convey a tenancy in common to the wife. They
argued that the deed failed to create an estate by the entireties because the interests of both husband and wife did not accrue by the
same instrument and did not commence at the same time.
The Florida Court had a similar problem before it in the previous
year. In Dixon v. Becker-0 a brother and sister held land as tenants
in common under their father's will. They agreed to partition the
land by conveyances of specific parcels executed respectively by each
and spouse. The sister died; and her husband, assuming that he owned
the parcel by right of survivorship, sold the land deeded to him
and his wife. The children of the wife then brought suit to adjudicate their interest in the lands that had been conveyed by the husband.
The Florida Court reasoned that since the sister already owned a
one-half undivided interest in the property that was deeded to her
and her husband, an estate by the entireties was created in only the
additional one-half interest that they received jointly. The case is based
on the theory that the sister had never joined in a deed to herself
and her husband of her undivided portion of that tract.
The Florida Third District Court of Appeal recently held that
a conveyance by a husband to his wife of an undivided one-half
interest in real property, with the express statement that it was
the intent of the grantor to create an estate by the entireties, did not
accomplish this result but created a tenancy in common with the
right of survivorship. 8 The court said that an estate by the entireties is created only by the husband's conveyance of the fee directly
to his wife with the stated purpose of creating a tenancy by the entireties.88

A federal court applying Florida law has ruled that the conveyance of property by husband and wife to themselves as grantees
has the effect of creating a tenancy by the entireties, and that section
689.11 of the Florida statutes is not the exclusive method of creating
the tenancy.8 9
85. 128 Fla. at 514, 189 So. at 668.
86. 134 Fla. 547, 184 So. 114 (1938).
87. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. Eastman, 105 So. 2d 912 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1958).
88. Id. at 913; see Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 247 (1948).
89. Schuler v. Claughton, 248 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Under the statute, conveyance of the fee to non-homestead property by husband to wife as sole grantee with the expression of an
intent to create an estate by the entireties will create the estate. At
common law the usual method of conveying a husband's sole property
so as to create a tenancy by the entireties was to use a "straw man"
conveyance and a reconveyance to husband and wife. The statute
avoids a burdensome circuity of conveyancing, albeit some of the
traditional features or unities of the estate are dispensed with, such
as unity of time and title.
Under the statute one spouse would be safe in conveying to the
other by using the following words of limitation so that the intent
to create an estate would be absolutely clear: "to grant, bargain, sell,
and transfer such interest in Blackacre as will under the statute create
an estate by the entirety."9 0 The statute, however, does not cover
situations in which the husband does not own the fee or desires to
create an estate by the entireties in a lesser estate.
Conveyance of the fee by the husband to his wife and himself
as co-grantees does not meet the letter of the statute, although it
certainly reflects its spirit by avoiding third-party arrangements. The
Supreme Court's divided affirmance of such a conveyance in Johnson
v. Landefeld 9' is of questionable reliability as precedent. However,
the contention of the dissenting justices in that case that a grantor
cannot convey to himself seems greatly weakened by the legislation
that allows creation of the tenancy without the traditional unities
of an estate by the entireties.
In summary, a spouse can safely create an estate by the entireties
in severalty land only by using a third party or by following the
statute strictly. A direct conveyance by one spouse to both spouses
as grantees or a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest by one
spouse to the other possibly will not be held to create a tenancy by
the entireties.
TERMINATION OF THE ESTATE

An estate by the entireties can be terminated only when (1) both
spouses join in a conveyance, (2) one spouse dies and the survivor
acquires the sole interest, (3) one spouse conveys to the other, or (4)
the relationship is dissolved by divorce and the parties become tenants
in common.9 2 Any discussion of the termination of the estate neces90. See Note, 1 U. FLA. L. RV. 433, 439 (1948).
91. 138 Fla. 511, 189 So. 666 (1939).
92. In re Lyons' Estate, 90 So. 2d 39, 40-41 (Fla. 1956) (dictum). FLA.

STAT.

§689.15 (1959) provides that tenants by the entireties become tenants in common
upon divorce. The legislature has provided a procedure whereby the guardian
of a person adjudged insane or mentally or physically incompetent can convey
or encumber entireties property upon application to the court if the competent
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sarily presupposes the requisite intention to create the tenancy. The
varying rules controlling creation of the tenancy have been alluded
to earlier.9 3
Effect of Divorce
The Florida Supreme Court has thus expressed the effect of divorce upon a tenancy by the entireties: 94
"When the marriage relationship is ended there is occasion
to take inventory, so to speak, and wind up the interests of
the parties in the property acquired through common effort ....
[T]he law provides that holders of estates by the entireties...
become tenants in common upon divorce. .

.

. In such way

all the unities present in joint tenancy and the unity of person,
characteristic of such estates, are reduced to the lone unity
of possession."
Florida courts have repeatedly held that under the statute the
parties become tenants in common upon divorce unless one of the
spouses has an equitable interest in the property beyond the legal
interest.95 This interest can be established by rebutting the presumption of gift to the wife, 96 or by failure of the husband to rebut
the presumption of resulting trust when the wife supplied the consideration for the purchase of the property.9 7 Therefore, it is reversible error for the chancellor to award property held by the entireties
to one of the spouses without a finding of some special equity in the
property beyond the legal interest. 9s And the fact that the purchase
money for the tenancy by the entireties is secured by a mortgage on
the wife's separate property does not establish a special equity in her
favor when the mortgage payments are made from a joint bank account of husband and wife. 99
Although the general rule is that the chancellor cannot direct
disposition of the parties' property merely as an incident of divorce, 100
spouse agrees to join in the sale or conveyance. One half of the proceeds goes to
the guardian and the other half to the competent spouse. The guardian also
collects all payments or rentals on realty or personalty held by the entireties and
pays one half to the competent spouse. FLA. STAT. §745.15 (3) (1959).
93. See subheading, "Rule of Construction or Rule of Law?," at note 26
supra.
94. Clawson v. Clawson, 54 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1951).
95. E.g., Latta v. Latta, 121 So. 2d 42 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Jones v. Jones,
121 So. 2d 811 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
96. Fuller v. Fuller, 38 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1948).
97. Allen v. Allen, 123 So. 2d 355 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
98. Holmes v. Holmes, 95 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1957); Latta v. Latta, supra note 95.
99. Jones v. Jones, 121 So. 2d 811 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
100. Boles v. Boles, 59 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1952); Bell v. Bell, 112 So. 2d 63
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there are exceptions. For example, the court may award the husband's
interest to the wife as lump sum alimony. 1° 1 Since the award of the
husband's interest is denominated lump sum alimony, an adulterous
wife cannot receive more than her legal interest in entireties property
102
in the absence of a showing of a special equity in the property.
But the award of specific entireties property to the adulterous wife
that is based on a special equity arising from her contribution of
funds or services beyond the performance of ordinary marital duties
is not alimony that is barred by the Florida statutes.' 03 Furthermore,
a husband's interest in property held by the entireties cannot be
granted to the wife as lump sum alimony when alimony in installments also is awarded.104 Another exception to the general rule is
that the chancellor may charge entireties property with the husband's
obligation to support the wife by giving her the use, occupancy, and
control of the property; this is true even though the property is
homestead. 10 5 Such a decree does not divest the husband of his
interest in the property; it merely makes his interest subject to the
use of the wife. Though recognizing the husband as a tenant in
common of the property while it is being subjected to the use of his
family, the judiciary will refuse to partition the land charged with
such a purpose 0
When the chancellor denies a divorce he is without power to
order an adjudication of the joint property interests.107 The unity
of person continues, at least in contemplation of law. The Florida
Court reasons that adjudication of property interests is senseless unless the marriage is terminated, because the parties may become
reconciled. Hence appointment of a receiver to manage the couple's
property until they are divorced or agree to a division of the property is reversible error. 08 The Court has been criticized for this
position. The critics see no reason why a court should not entertain
partition suits between parties to a marriage. 09° An adjudication of
joint property interests cannot be made even if the wife is granted
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Banfi v. Banfi, 123 So. 2d 52, 53 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960)
(dictum).
101. Kilian v. Kilian, 97 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1957); Reid v. Reid, 68 So. 2d 821
(Fla. 1953); see Benson v. Benson, 102 So. 2d 748 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
102. Benson v. Benson, 102 So. 2d 748 (3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 105 So. 2d
792 (Fla. 1958).
103. Eakin v. Eakin, 99 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1958), FLA. STAT. §65.08 (1959).
104. Bailey v. Bailey, 126 So. 2d 165 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
105. Banks v. Banks, 98 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1957); Bailey v. Bailey, supra note 104.
106. Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253 (1947); see Fuller v. Fuller,
38 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1948).
107. Clawson v. Clawson, 54 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1951).
108. Ibid.
109. Id. at 164 (dissenting opinion).
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separate maintenance.110 It has been said that there is no reason
to refuse severance of the marriage unity in one sense by denying a
divorce and to grant it in the property sense by adjudicating separate
property interests.,
In summary, the parties may pray for partition of the property
in the divorce proceeding if they so desire and thus sever the resulting tenancy in common, but in this event the chancellor must
follow the statutory requirements"1 - in decreeing the partition.' 13
The parties can also dispose of property held by the entireties by
having a private property settlement incorporated into the divorce
n4
decree.
UnilateralAlienation of the Estate
The underlying theory of an estate by the entireties is that neither
spouse can alienate the estate without the consent of the other. The
Florida Supreme Court has used agency doctrine to permit one spouse
alone to sever the estate in joint bank accounts" 5 and negotiable
instruments.'" For example, if the spouses individually take funds
from a joint bank account and thereafter divide and exercise separate
dominion over bonds purchased with the funds, there is no con1 7
tinuation of the estate in the bonds.
Each tenant by the entireties owes the other the highest degree
of confidence and trust. Accordingly, the Court once held that one
of the spouses alone cannot purchase a tax deed to entireties property
and thereafter claim that this divested the other spouse of his interest
in the property."' This case involved the purchase of tax deeds under
the Murphy Act, which provided that any money paid for the tax
deed in excess of the tax and liens went to the owners of the property.", The Court based its decision on the theory that since the
110. Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 157 Fla. 800, 25 So. 2d 859 (1946). See
Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 44 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 1950), in which the Court held
that a mortgage on the business held by the entireties should be paid out of
business income and not out of the husband's separate part of the business income,
the parties to share equally in the equity upon termination of the estate.
111. Junk v. Junk, 65 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1953); cf. Field v. Field, 68 So. 2d 376
(Fa. 1953) (wife cannot be ordered to relinquish dower when divorce is denied).
112.

113.
114.
115.
116.
note 200
117.
118.
Spencer,
119.

FLA. STAT. §§66.01-.09 (1959).

Banfi v. Banfi, 123 So. 2d 52 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Weigel v. Wiener, 149 Fla. 231, 5 So. 2d 447 (1942).
See subheading "Personal Property," at note 31 supra.
See subheading "Agency and Other Relations with Third Parties," at
infra.
Rader v. First Nat'l Bank, 42 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1949).
Andrews v. Andrews, 155 Fla. 654, 21 So. 2d 205 (1945); cf. Spencer v.
160 Fla. 749, 86 So. 2d 424 (1948).
Fla. Laws 1937, ch. 18296.
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spouses are "one" in law, the default of one in not paying taxes is
the default of the other and the act of one in purchasing the tax
deed is likewise the act of both. The Court has subsequently ruled,
however, that a joint tenant who purchases a tax deed other than
under the Murphy Act acquires the complete interest in the property by virtue of the original tax deed.120 Although this case involved
joint tenants, the Court clearly implied that a tenant by the entireties
can also purchase a tax deed on the estate and cut off the rights of
the other spouse.' ,2 This opens the door for one spouse to defraud
22
the other by not paying the taxes and then terminating the tenancy.
But the spouses still owe some fiduciary duty to each other. If they
sign a purchase money mortgage on entireties property, the wife
cannot purchase the mortgage for a valuable consideration from the
2
mortgagee and enforce it against the property. 3
Florida courts have had to wrestle with the conflicting theories
of partnership law and property law when a partnership interest is
held by the entireties. It is well recognized that a partnership can
be dissolved at will; it is equally true that ordinarily the sole act
of a tenant by the entireties cannot sever the tenancy. The problem
is compounded by the fact that if one of the spouses were to drain off
the profits and waste the business, the courts would be without power
to prevent it if property concepts were blindly followed. The Second
District Court of Appeal resolved this apparent conflict and granted
dissolution of a partnership held by the entireties."22 The lower
court had refused dissolution on the theory that a tenancy by the entireties cannot be severed by the act of a single spouse. The Court
of Appeal said that partnership law and tenancy law are not in conflict and that a partnership can be dissolved without affecting the
tenancy, since the proceeds of dissolution will still be impressed with
the tenancy. The Court further stated that one tenant may apply
for judicial protection of his rights in entireties property and that
equity will grant relief if the peculiar circumstances of the case so
warrant.
There is also the possibility that the spouses can vary by contract
the usual rule against severance without joint consent. The income
from, or the proceeds of, the sale of real estate held by the entireties
is equally the property of husband and wife. But the spouses can
contract for each to receive half of the proceeds from the sale of the
120. Logan v. Ward, 48 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1950).
121. Id. at 527.
122. This might also be a procedure whereby the estate might be terminated
without incurring unpleasant tax consequences.
123. Brocato v. Brocato, 74 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1954).
124. Lacker v. Zuern, 109 So. 2d 180 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959). See also Clawson
v. Clawson, 54 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1951) (dictum).
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property, and in this event half will go to the estate of the deceased
2

spouse.1 5

The unilateral action of one of the spouses in conveying to the
other an undivided one-half interest in property held by the entireties has also been held to destroy the tenancy, leaving the complete fee in the grantee. 126 Although it is well settled that the husband
cannot convey his interest in an estate by the entireties to a third
party without joinder of his wife, the statute permitting direct conveyances between husband and wife allows him to convey the fee to
her without her joinder. It is said that acceptance by the wife of the
1 7
conveyance manifests her consent to the transfer. 2
Term ination by Death
Although it has been said that the surviving tenant by the entireties takes by survivorship,12s the accepted theory is that both
spouses own the complete fee during their lives; when one dies his
or her interest is merely extinguished, and no new estate is taken by
survivorship. 29 When real estate is devised or conveyed to husband
and wife, the survivor will come into full ownership of the property
upon the death of one of the tenants. 30 But personal property in
the names of husband and wife may or may not go absolutely to the
survivor, depending upon a determination of whether an estate by
the entireties was created. 31
A problem frequently arises as to whether the surviving spouse
is entitled to contribution for, or exoneration of, a mortgage debt
on entireties property in a suit against the personal representative of
the deceased spouse. Florida holds that the surviving spouse is not
entitled to contribution or exoneration of even one half of the mortgage debt, even though the deceased spouse signed the mortgage."'2
It is consistent to say that the entire mortgage debt is owed by each
of the spouses if it is said that each of the spouses owns all of the
estate. But circumstances might arise in which the surviving spouse
would be entitled to contribution from the estate. For example, if instead of a purchase money mortgage, the debt represented money ob125. Dodson v. National Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947).
126. Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941).
127. Ibid.
128. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938).
129. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956); Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So. 2d
644 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
130. See subheading "Real Property," at note 29 supra.
131. See subheading "Personal Property," at note 31 supra.
132. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956); Durlacher v. First Nat'l Bank,
100 So. 2d 73 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
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tained by the deceased for the operation of his business or merely for
personal reasons, there might arise a right to equitable contribution
from the estate. 133
As will be brought out in a later section, property that acquired
entireties status before it acquired homestead status vests completely
in the survivor by operation of law rather than under the constitutional and statutory provisions controlling descent of homestead
4M
property.
Another problem is whether the agreement of tenants by the entireties that each will take all joint property and that the survivor
will leave it to named beneficiaries is binding. The First District
Court of Appeal in Weiss v. Storm'1 3 held that such a will is binding
and that the attempt of the survivor to leave the property to someone
other than the one designated is of no effect. The court said that
the uncertainty as to which tenant would survive the other, coupled
with the fact that title so held vests exclusively in the survivor, constitutes adequate consideration to support the mutual promise to
make a will.
Suppose that a tenant by the entireties murders his or her spouse
and commits suicide. Who takes the property - the heirs of the
wife or the heirs of the husband? Section 731.31 of Florida Statutes
1959 provides that any person convicted of murder cannot inherit
from the decedent or take any portion of the decedent's estate as a
legatee or as a devisee. The Florida Supreme Court reversed a lower
court holding that the victim's heirs take all of the property."3 0 The
Court held the statute inapplicable because one spouse does not "inherit" the interest of the other in an estate by the entireties but
merely comes into full beneficial ownership of it. The Court held
further that the heirs of the wife were entitled to one half of the
property and that the heirs of the husband were entitled to the
other half. The decision was based on the equitable principle that
no one should be permitted to profit by his own crime and upon the
Missouri rule that "where the husband by his willful, felonious act
dissolves the marital relationship, and as a consequence there is a
severance of the estate by the entirety, such property may well be
treated as held by tenants in common."'13
On occasion a person includes in his will property held by the
133. Lopez v. Lopez, 90 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1956) (dictum).
134. Harkins v. Holt, 124 Fla. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936); Kinney v. Mosher, 100
So. 2d 644 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
135. 126 So. 2d 295 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961); accord, Ugent v. Boehmke, 123
So. 2d 387 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Fleming v. Fleming, 194 Iowa 104, 180 N.W.
206 (1920). But see Hall v. Roberts, 146 Fla. 444, 1 So. 2d 579 (1941).
136. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 1951).
137. Id. at 850.
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entireties. A problem of will construction then confronts the court.
Did the husband intend for his wife to share in his testamentary
disposition only if she renounces her interests in property held by
the entireties? Must the wife elect between taking under the husband's
will and taking the entireties property outright? Apparently this
point has not been finally determined in Florida.13 It has been said,
however, that the wife should be forced to elect, since by taking under
the will and claiming property outside the will she would be asserting
inconsistent rights." 9°
In case of the simultaneous death of tenants by the entireties,
section 736.05 (3) of Florida Statutes 1959 provides that property held
by the entireties shall be distributed equally to the heirs of the wife
and the heirs of the husband.
In ter Vivos Disposal - Specific Performance
Under the common law rule the husband's conveyance of an estate
by the entireties was subject to the wife's indivisible right to the
entire estate in case she should survive him. 4 0 If the husband survived the wife, her rights were extinguished and his conveyance to
a third party estopped him from asserting an interest against his
grantee.141 Estates by the entireties could not be conveyed by livery
of seisin by the husband; they as well as dower interests were conveyed
in a collusive suit known as fine and common recovery. 1' 2 After
Florida abolished this class of suit, it was asserted that it was impossible to convey the wife's interest in property. The Supreme
Court pointed out that the statutes then in effect made conveyances
by married women valid when they were duly executed by husband
and wife, and that the acknowledgment of the wife apart from the
husband substituted for the fine and common recovery. 4 3
Generally it may be said that, because of the unity of interest of
husband and wife in an estate by the entireties, neither can alone
sell, lease, or contract for its sale.144 The Florida Court has indicated
that a lease signed only by the wife would be valid if it could be shown
that she was acting as agent of her husband. 45 Possession of the
138. See Colclazier v. Colclazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956) (semble).
139. Id. at 265 (dissenting opinion).
140. Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935).
141. Ibid. It is uncertain whether the husband's deed would today estop him
from asserting an interest against the grantee, since Florida cases indicate that
such conveyances without joinder of both spouses are void. See Uniform Title
Standard 6.3, 20 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1960).
142. Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935).
143. Ibid.
144. Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So. 2d 80 (1946).
145. Cooper v. Maynard, 156 Fla. 534, 23 So. 2d 734 (1945).
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premises by the vendee and also part performance would perhaps
vitiate the requirement that both spouses must sign the instrument."'4
And a wife possessing a written power of attorney from her husband
1 47
can enter into an enforceable contract to sell entireties property.
Much of the confusion surrounding the formal requirements for
making an enforceable conveyance, lease, or mortgage of entireties
property stems from the fact that the property may also constitute
a homestead and from the debate as to whether the wife's interest
is her separate property within the contemplation of the conveyancing acts and the Constitution.
A contract for the sale of homestead property can be specifically
enforced only if executed by husband and wife in the presence of
two subscribing witnesses.148 Likewise, in the absence of estoppel,' 49
a mortgage on homestead property must be duly executed by husband
and wife in the presence of two subscribing witnesses in order to be
enforceable.150 But the sellers have been held estopped to deny the
validity of a contract when they had signed a deed and had surrendered it to their broker for the purpose of obtaining the signature
of witnesses before forwarding the instrument to the purchasers, who
in the meantime had materially changed their position.' 5' In a recent
opinion the Florida Supreme Court stated that the present law requires that, in order to be specifically enforceable, agreements to
convey homestead property, to convey the separate property of married
women, and to release dower must be signed by both husband and
wife in the presence of two subscribing witnesses.152
A question then arises as to the necessary requirements for a valid
contract for sale of entireties property. The most recent expression
of a Florida court has been that a contract pertaining to entireties
property, signed by both spouses but not executed in the presence
of two subscribing witnesses, is not specifically enforceable.' 53

146. Ibid.
147. Knowlton v. Dean, 159 Fla. 98, 31 So. 2d 58 (1947).
148. Abercrombie v. Eidschun, 66 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1953); Scott v. Hotel
Martinique, Inc., 48 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1950).
149. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 141 Fla. 164, 192 So. 637 (1939) (holding
that the wife's negligence estopped her from attacking the acknowledgment of the
notary).
150. Oates v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Fla. 678, 116 Fla. 253, 117 Fla. 892,
152 So. 671 (1934); 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1936); 130 Fla. 851, 178 So. 570
(1937); 141 Fla. 614, 192 So. 637 (1939); 144 Fla. 744, 198 So. 681 (1940); cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 614 (1941).
151. Cox v. La Pota, 76 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1954).
152. Zimmerman v. Diedrich, 97 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1957).
153. Petersen v. Brotman, 100 So. 2d 821 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); cf. Mister
v. Thompson, 114 So. 2d 507 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
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CORRELATION WITH HOMIESTEAD LAW

Property held by the entireties can also qualify as a homestead for
purposes of exemption from forced sale for individual or joint debts
of the spouses if one of the spouses is the head of the family living
on the premises.15 4 Homestead property held by the entireties, however, vests by operation of law in the surviving spouse and nothing
remains to be affected by the constitutional and statutory provisions
controlling descent of homesteads. 5 After the death of the head of
the family the property is no longer a homestead unless a new homestead results through the surviving spouse's living on the property
as the head of a family.156
The important question that controls the descent of homestead
entireties property is whether the property qualified as a homestead
of one of the spouses at the time of conveyance into an estate by the
entireties. A typical situation occurs when a couple with children
decide to convert homestead property in the name of one spouse into
an estate by the entireties. Both spouses join in deeding the property
to a third person, who conveys it back to the husband and wife.
Such attempts to alienate the homestead have invariably been voided
by the Florida Court, 1 57 since a conveyance of homestead property

without consideration is a fraud upon the children's remainder interest in the property upon the death of the head of the family.1Ss
Furthermore, it is possible that section 95.23 of Florida Statutes 1959,
which provides that a deed to property of record for over twenty
years bars claims of other persons against the land, will not be applied when the head of the family has attempted wrongfully to convert the homestead into an estate by the entireties.1- 9
154. Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932). It has been
suggested that since neither husband nor wife owns property that is in legal contemplation owned by the unity of husband and wife, homestead status logically
cannot attach to entireties property, because headship of the family and ownership of the land are not vested in the same person. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal
Chameleon, The Florida Homestead Exemption: I-11!, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 12, 34
(1949).
155. Menendez v. Rodriguez, supra note 154; Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So. 2d
644 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958); see Harkins v. Holt, 124 Fla. 774, 169 So. 481 (1936).
156. Norman v. Kannon, 133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938); see Anderson v.
Anderson, 44 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1950) (wife can be head of family so as to constitute a homestead); Passmore v. Morrison, 63 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1953) (surviving
wife could devise homestead property held by the entireties to the exclusion of
an adopted son when it was shown that the minor child had not lived with the
adoptive mother for two years before or after the death of the husband).
157. E.g., Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So. 2d 298 (1947); Bess
v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931); Reed v. Fain, 122 So. 2d 322
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
158. Reed v. Fain, supra note 157; Norman v. Kannon, supra note 156.
159. Reed v. Fain, supra note 157. But see Thompson v. Thompson, 70 So. 2d

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1961

25

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Florida Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1961], Art. 1

Of course, if at the time of the "straw man" conveyances the
property was not a homestead, it will go to the surviving spouse instead of descending according to homestead law.160 And a conveyance
of homestead property by tenants by the entireties to a third party
and a subsequent reconveyance to only the head of the family may
be shown under proper circumstances to have been a mortgage and
mortgage satisfaction, with the property retaining its status as an
estate by the entireties. 161
The Florida judiciary has consistently held that a homestead in
the sole name of the head of the family cannot be alienated without
consideration.16 2 The question arises whether this restriction will be
imposed upon the owners of homestead property held by the entireties. The Florida Supreme Court has held that the homestead
provisions of the Constitution were adopted for the benefit of the
heirs of a head of a family and do not apply to entireties property,
since the property does not inure to them upon death of the head of
the family. The Court said:163
"The fact that exemptions from liens and forced sales may be
claimed by the head of a family during his lifetime on a home
place owned by the entireties makes no difference in the operation of the law as respects the right of tenants by the entireties to make a conveyance of the property in the same manner as any other property owned by the tenants may be conveyed."
The children theoretically have an expectancy in the homestead
held by the entireties, since the head of the family may survive the
other spouse. This, however, is not sufficient to prevent a gratuitous
conveyance of the property by the husband and wife.
Section 4 of article X of the Constitution provides that a deed
alienating the homestead must be executed by husband and wife.
Section 689.11 of Florida Statutes 1959 provides that direct conveyances between husband and wife do not require joinder of the
grantee-spouse. The Florida Court has held that the direct-conveyance
statute is not applicable when homestead property owned solely by the
head of the family is conveyed to the other spouse, and that the
wife must join in a deed conveying the property to her.104 Joinder
555 (Fla. 1954).
160. Menendez v. Rodriguez, 106 Fla. 214, 143 So. 223 (1932).
161. Kinney v. Mosher, 100 So. 2d 644 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
162. E.g., cases cited note 157 supra.
163. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416, 418 (Fla. 1950) (alternative holding).
164. Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla. 653, 18 So. 2d 683 (1944); Jahn v. Purvis, 145
Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); Byrd v. Byrd, 73 Fla. 322, 74 So. 313 (1917); Thomas
v. Craft, 55 Fla. 842, 46 So. 594 (1908).
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of the wife in the deed may be required even when the wife pays a
valuable consideration for the homestead property.0 5
As a part of a separation agreement the head of the family on
occasion deeds the homestead to the wife without her joinder. In
this situation, the Court can easily find abandonment of the homestead in order to uphold the conveyance made without the joinder of
the wife.', , In Rawlins v. Dade Lumber Co. 6 7 the Court could have
found abandonment in a case in which the husband alone conveyed
to the wife homestead property prior to divorce. The couple had no
children. The Court preferred, however, to base its decision on the
theory that when the wife is the only "heir" under the Constitution
she is not required to join in the conveyance. In estates by the entireties the children also have no inheritable interest in the property, and logically the wife should not have to join in the conveyance
to her of homestead property held by the entireties. This belief is
enforced by the Court's holdings that tenants by the entireties may
dispose of homestead property in the same manner as other property
held by the entireties,c s and that entireties property may be conveyed
69
to one spouse without the grantee's joining in executing the deed.
165. See Thomas v. Craft, supra note 164, in which the Court stated that
the constitutional provisions for alienation of the homestead must be followed
even when the conveyances are between members of the family. But see Church
v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 489, 136 So. 242, 247 (1931), in which the Court said: "In
fact, to require the wife to unite in executing a conveyance to herself would be
'to demand the performance of an absurd and idle act.'" This statement was
purely dictum, since in the Church case the wife had joined in the conveyance
to herself; but the conveyance was held invalid because it would defeat the rights
of the children guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court in Church intimated
that the decision in Thomas should be limited to a situation in which the husband
conveys to his wife and children without the joinder of his wife. The wife was
not shown to have paid consideration for the conveyances of the homestead in
either case.
166. Moore v. Hunter, 153 Fla. 158, 13 So. 2d 909 (1943); Miller v. West Palm
Beach At. Nat'l Bank, 142 Fla. 22, 194 So. 230 (1940).
167. 80 Fla. 398, 86 So. 334 (1920).
168. Denham v. Sexton, 48 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 1950).
169. Hunt v. Covington, 145 Fla. 706, 200 So. 76 (1941). Knowlton v. Dean,
159 Fla. 98, 31 So. 2d 58 (1947), held that homestead property held by the
entireties had been abandoned and that the wife could exercise a special power
of attorney granted her by her husband to enter into a contract to sell the property that would be specifically enforceable in a suit by the husband and wife.
The decision did not specify whether both spouses would have had to join in
the conveyance if the entireties property had retained its homestead character at
the time the contract of sale was made. FLA. STAT. §708.09 (1959) provides
that husband and wife may convey property held by the entireties by using a
power of attorney given by the other spouse. But id. §708.10(5) says that this
provision shall not be construed as dispensing with the joinder of husband and
wife in conveying or mortgaging homestead property. The statute is thus of little
aid in determining whether one spouse may convey to the other entireties property
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What happens when the wife desires to convey her interest in
homestead entireties property to the husband, who is the head of
the family? If the provision requiring that both spouses join in the
deed is carried to its logical extreme, the conveyance vesting sole
title in the head of the family will be void. But certainly this is not
an alienation of the homestead; in fact, it vests title in the head of
the family so as to give the children an inheritable interest for the
first time. In this situation the Constitution should be construed
as not requiring joinder of both spouses.
Since the constitutional provision may ultimately be construed
as requiring the joinder of both spouses in conveying to one spouse
homestead property held by the entireties, it is perhaps advisable
to have both spouses join in the deed even though their joinder may
seem to be an idle act.
The conversion of homestead property in the sole name of the
head of the family into an estate by the entireties may also be
accomplished by a sale for a valuable consideration 170 or by prior
abandonment. 17' The Court has held' that sufficient consideration
was present when a wife and husband joined in conveying the husband's homestead property to a third party for a sum of cash and a
mortgage, payable to the wife and husband, that was canceled three
years later in exchange for a reconveyance to them by the entireties. 172
A single homestead can include both property held by the entireties and property in the sole name of the head of the family.
In this situation, upon death of the head of the family the property
held by the entireties vests absolutely in the wife and the descent of
the remainder is controlled by the homestead provisions.273
THE RIGHTS OF CREDITORS AND THIRD PARTIES

Creditors of husband and wife are often in a quandary as to
whether they can levy upon property held by the spouses by the enthat is also the homestead without both joining in the deed.
170. See Weigel v. Wiener, 149 Fla. 231, 5 So. 2d 447 (1942). The requirement
of consideration is relaxed when the children of the couple are included as
grantees, even when some children are excluded. The burden of. proof is upon
the person asserting lack of consideration. Alienation of the homestead can be
accomplished by a deed from husband and wife to husband and wife for life,
with remainder to some of the children. See Parrish v. Robbirds, 146 Fla. 324,
200 So. 925 (1941); Jones v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 126 Fla. 527, 171 So. 317
(1936); Daniels v. Mercer, 105 Fla. 362, 141 So. 189 (1932).
171. See Marsh v. Hartley, 109 So. 2d 34 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (abandonment
not shown before conveyance into entireties, although family was away from
homestead for four years and the property was rented during that time).
172. Miller v. Mobley, 136 Fla. 351, 186 So. 797 (1939).
173. Wilson v. Florida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 64 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1953).
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tireties. Debtors legitimately wonder if they must pay off obligations
to the spouses jointly when the instrument evidencing the indebtedness is made payable to husband and wife. Prospective purchasers of
property want to know whether they can rely on a prior conveyance of
property held by the entireties. These problems and many others
are the heritage of recognition of the tenancy by the entireties.
Individual Debts of the Spouses
17 4
The Florida Supreme Court in Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave
ruled that non-homestead real property held by the entireties cannot
be subjected to the individual debts of one of the spouses. The
creditor in this case had asked that the chancellor adjudicate the
separate interest of the debtor-spouse without damaging or interfering with the lawful rights of the other spouse. In the alternative,
the creditor asked that the court decree that a portion of the income
from the rental property be applied to the judgment during the life
of the debtor-spouse. The Supreme Court recognized that some jurisdictions allow such a levy on entireties property on the theory that
at common law a husband was entitled to possession and control and
could dispose of the rents and profits during the joint lives of the
spouses. In rejecting this approach the Court pointed out that
Florida's married women's acts have deprived the husband of pos75
session and control of the property of the wife and stated:1

"'If the husband can dispose of the estate during their joint
lives, the wife is deprived of the enjoyment without her conThe right of the wife to the joint enjoyment of the
sent ....
estate during the marriage is as valuable and sacred as the
right of taking the entire estate by survivorship upon the
There is an equity in equality; but
death of her husband ....
there is gross iniquity and injustice in permitting the husband
to deprive the wife of the use and enjoyment of an estate that
does not belong exclusively to either, but to both, and which
belongs as much to the wife as to the husband.'"
The Court rejected the argument that a rule forbidding levy on estates
by the entireties by individual creditors would open the door to fraud
on creditors with the terse comment that if such a situation presented
itself the Court would apply its power to set aside the fraudulent conveyances. This rule has become well established and has been adhered to in subsequent cases involving real estate held by the entire174. 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).

175. Id. at 463, 84 So. at 378. Thus the same statutes that were held not
applicable in 1913 to abrogate the tenancy became relevant only seven years later

to extend its incidents.
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ties.176 It also is apparent that creditors cannot levy upon personal
property held by the entireties to satisfy the separate debts of the
spouses."

7

Joint Debts
A creditor of both the husband and the wife can levy upon nonhomestead property held by the spouses by the entireties." 8 But if
the property is also the homestead of the spouses, even joint creditors
cannot levy upon the property." 9 Section 2 of article X of the Constitution provides that the exemption from forced sale shall inure to
the widow and heirs of the head of the family. This provision has
been interpreted as forbidding levy against the homestead by creditors
of the head of the family after his death. 80 Does the exemption from
forced sale inure to the widow when the homestead is held by the
entireties? The widow acquires the property by virtue of the original
title creating the estate and not through operation of the homestead
law; hence the exemption does not inure to her. Joint debts, although
barred while the head of the family was alive because of the property's
homestead character, logically can be the basis of execution against
the widow unless the property acquires a new homestead status.' 8 '
The property is exempt from liability for separate debts of the
176. E.g., State ex rel. Molter v. Johnson, 107 Fla. 47, 144 So. 299 (1932);
Hart v. Atwood, 96 Fla. 667, 119 So. 116 (1928); Yafanaro v. Ninos, 123 So. 2d
286 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
177. Lindsley v. Phare, 115 Fla. 454, 155 So. 812 (1934); Winters v. Parks,
91 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1956) (dictum); see Kornberg v. Krupka, 118 So. 2d 790
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); cf., Sheldon v. Waters, 168 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948). See
Ritter, supra note 6, at 163, for a logical analysis that would subject the tenancy
composed of personalty to the separate debts of either spouse.
178. Stanley v. Powers, 123 Fla. 359, 166 So. 843 (1936).
179. Coleman v. Williams, 146 Fla. 45, 200 So. 207 (1941).
180. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 837, 13 So. 2d 448 (1943);
Cumberland & Liberty Mills v. Keggin, 139 Fla. 133, 190 So. 492 (1939).
181. A liberal construction of the homestead exemption could result in barring
the creditor from levying on the property even though a new homestead status
is not attained. The Court could say that even though the property does not
descend under the homestead law, the surviving spouse in fact is a widow, that
the manner in which she acquired her interest was of no importance, and that when
a debt of the head of the family is barred at the time of his death the exemption
from forced sale as to that debt inures to the surviving spouse. But a joint
obligation of the spouses is not extinguished by the death of one of them; even
if the exemption from sale for the spouse's debt inures to the survivor, the survivor is still separately liable. And a creditor can levy upon the former homestead to satisfy a separate debt of the beneficiary even if the deceased head of
the family was the sole owner of the property and the beneficiary is an heir within
the constitutional provisions. Cf. Donly v. Metropolitan Realty & Inv. Co., 71
Fla. 644, 72 So. 178 (1916) (assignee of heir entitled to partition former homestead property).
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decedent, not because the homestead exemption inures to the widow
but because the property of the surviving spouse cannot be sold to
pay the decedent's separate debts.1'

2

Fraudulent Conveyances
Although the law of fraudulent conveyances is beyond the scope
of this article, the Florida cases involving tenancies by the entireties
will be briefly summarized. In an early case the Florida Supreme
Court held that a gift of property to a wife by a husband in embarrassed circumstances could be reached by the husband's creditors
because "'a man must be just before he can be permitted to be
generous ...
"'183 The Court at one time took the position that
a voluntary conveyance of property to a spouse without consideration,
or a conversion of individual property into a tenancy by the entireties,
coupled with an existing indebtedness of the husband, presented a
prima facie or presumptive case of fraud.284 Under this line of cases
the conveyances were not fraudulent per se, but the burden of proof
was on the grantee of the property to show the absence of fraud.1 8 5
Recent cases, however, have indicated that such conveyances will no
longer be deemed prima facie fraudulent. : 86 This, of course, does not
mean that fraudulent conveyances cannot be reached; it merely
places a greater burden of proof upon the creditor.
A conveyance by a husband to a third party and a reconveyance to
him and his wife during pendency of a suit tend strongly to indicate
fraud, and the conveyance will probably be set aside.2s 7 Also, contingent creditors, such as the surety on the note of the conveying
spouse, 1 8 or a person who has entered into an executory contract
with the conveying spouse, 5 9 can defeat such conveyances. On the
other hand, creditors of one of the spouses who become creditors
after the conveyance will find it more difficult to set aside the conveyance, especially if at the time of the voluntary transfer into a
tenancy by the entireties the debtor-spouse's other obligations are
trifling. 90 Thus there is some indication that a creditor attacking a
182. See Crosby & Miller, supra note 154, at 35.
183. Craig v. Gamble, 5 Fla. 430, 436 (1854).
184. Richardson v. Grill, 138 Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939); Sample v. Natalby,
120 Fla. 161, 162 So. 493 (1935); Reel v. Livingstone, 34 Fla. 377, 16 So. 284 (1894).
185. Cases cited note 184 supra.
186. Meyer v. Faust, 83 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1955); Vaughn v. Mandis, 53 So. 2d
704 (Fla. 1951); Kornberg v. Krupka, 118 So. 2d 790 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960); cf.
State Bank of Haines City v. Lockhart, 120 Fla. 278, 162 So. 691 (1935).
187. Sample v. Natalby, 120 Fla. 161, 162 So. 493 (1935).
188. Reel v. Livingstone, 34 Fla. 377, 16 So. 284 (1894).
189. Whetstone v. Coslick, 117 Fla. 203, 157 So. 666 (1934).
190. Richardson v. Grill, 138 Fla. 787, 190 So. 255 (1939).
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purported fraudulent conveyance must make some showing of reliance upon the fact that the property was in the sole name of the
debtor-spouse.
In view of the popularity of installment buying, dictum in one
Florida case presents a bright light to creditors.' 91 The Court said
that even if property purchased by installments is placed in the
names of husband and wife a long time before the husband incurs
debts, his creditors can reach property held by the entireties if the
husband continues to make payments on the property. This theory
is based on the contention that injustice to subsequent creditors would
result if debtors were permitted to apply periodic payments toward
the creation of an estate that would be beyond the reach of their
creditors.
If an individual judgment creditor desires to reach jointly-held
property of spouses, it is essential that the spouse who was not sued
be impleaded in the supplemental execution proceeding. 192 This requirement is an element of constitutional due process of law that
affords the affected spouse an opportunity to be heard upon the issue
of her or his property rights. Failure to implead the wife will not
be excused by the fact that her spouse was fully represented by
counsel at the proceeding.193
Mechanics' and Materialmen'sLiens
Failure to pay for materials or labor used in building or repairing
property held by the entireties has been a fertile field of litigation.
Seemingly, building contractors invariably obtain the signature of
only one of the spouses on a repair or building contract. Under the
common law rule neither the husband nor the wife, acting separately, could subject an estate by the entireties to a lien. 94 The
Florida legislature has been aware of the undue hardship that this
rule works on building contractors and through the years has provided special relief for them. Under early statutes, materialmen and
mechanics could recover upon showing an express contract between
them and the spouses or upon showing that the work was done and
the materials furnished with the knowledge and assent of both husband and wife. 95 However, there was a tendency on the part of
the courts to construe strictly the legislative grace granted the contractors, and the contractors were required to follow the statute to
191. Whetstone v. Coslick, 117 Fla. 203, 208, 157 So. 666, 668 (1934).
192. Meyer v. Faust, supra note 186; Kornberg v. Krupka, supra note 186.
193. Meyer v. Faust, 83 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1955).
194. Allardice & Allardice, Inc. v. Weatherlow, 98 Fla. 475, 124 So. 38 (1929).
195. Ibid.; Logan Moore Lumber Co. v. Legato, 100 Fla. 1451, 181 So. 381

(1930).
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the letter as to allegations in the complaint, filing of the notice of
lien, and notice to the parties. 19G The coverage of the statute was
restricted by the Supreme Court to the construction or repair of
buildings or improvements of like character; hence a lien for cultivating, fertilizing, and caring for citrus trees was not allowed on a
19
grove held by the entireties. 7
The legislature has now adopted section 84.12 of the Florida
statutes, under which the contracting spouse is deemed the agent of
the other spouse unless the non-contracting spouse files an affirmative
objection with the clerk of the court within ten days after receiving
notice of the work being done on the property. But under this
statute a spouse living apart from the contracting spouse is relieved
of the duty of filing an objection. Also, even if the spouse is not
living apart from the contracting spouse, there must be knowledge
of the commencement of the work before the duty to protest arises"91
The statute cannot be utilized by a contractor who seeks to hold the
non-contracting spouse for the payment of a deficiency decree, since
the decree must rest upon a contractual obligation, not upon implications of agency. 99
Agency and Other Relations with Third Parties
In the area of personal property the Florida courts have shown
an inclination to allow one of the spouses to alienate the tenancy
by the entireties, and some of the statements by the courts are broad
enough to apply the concept of agency to transactions concerning
real estate,2 00 although it has not been done as yet. It has been held
that a note held by the entireties can be discharged by payment to
196. Velazquez v. Suarez, 113 Fla. 856, 152 So. 708 (1934); Mead v. Picotte, 101
Fla. 325, 134 So. 57 (1931); Ferdon v. Hendry Lumber Co., 97 Fla. 283, 120 So. 335
(1929).
197. Goldsmith v. Orange Belt Securities Co., 115 Fla. 683, 156 So. 3 (1934).
Since this case was decided the statute has been materially amended. But even
if a statutory lien is denied, it may be possible to establish an equitable lien
against the property. See Dewing v. Davis, 117 So. 2d 747 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
198. Penzi v. David, 122 So. 2d 635 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960) (mortgagee who
obtained signature of only one spouse on mortgage on entireties property given
for improvement loan cannot enforce lien against the property if the other spouse
lacked notice).
199. Meadows Southern Constr. Co. v. Pezzaniti, 108 So. 2d 499 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1959). But see Anderson v. Carter, 100 So. 2d 831 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). The
statutory lien against entireties property can be enforced only by a suit in equity.
FA. STAT. §86.03 (1959). But a suit on the contract at law is not barred. Id.,
§84.32.
200. See Lerner v. Lerner, 113 So. 2d 212 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (Court said
that either spouse presumptively has the power to act for both during coverture
as long as the proceeds from sale of the property inure to the benefit of both).
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either spouse or to both of them.20' Also, one of the spouses can
indorse a note held by them by the entireties, and the sole signature
will convey the entire estate.2 0 2 The expressed theory of these cases
is the old notion that husband and wife are indivisible, that the
possession of one is the possession of the other, and that hence one can
act for the other. The rationale, however, probably lies in the belief
that a contrary rule would subject many innocent third parties to
inequities. The fact remains that the holdings in this area are in
direct conflict with the great majority of other decisions in the
Florida case law of tenancy by the entireties, with no attempt at logical explanation of the results reached.
Purchasers of property held by the entireties usually pay for
the property by making out a check payable to both spouses. What
happens when the spouse to whom the check was delivered forges
the indorsement of the other spouse, cashes the check, and absconds
with the proceeds? Apparently the defrauded spouse cannot recover
against the drawer-purchaser, the bank that cashed the check, the
20
drawee bank, or an escrow holder. 3

As to the payment of a note held by the entireties, the maker
should check to see if the parties have been divorced. If they have,
they are tenants in common and each party is entitled to half of the
payments. 0 4 Payment to one of the spouses is risky, since the agency
relationship has ceased by virtue of the divorce decree. Similarly, the
clerk of the court may become liable to one of the parties after their
divorce if he pays over the surplus from a sale of former entireties
05
properties to only one of the spouses.2

A purchaser of a tax deed is well advised to make sure that each
spouse has notice of the tax sale of property held by the entireties.
An application for a tax deed mailed separately to husband and wife
but received only by the husband because of an incorrect address
of the wife gives inadequate notice, and a tax deed based thereon
is invalid.208
Another collateral problem that may arise concerns the status of
a tenant by the entireties who joins in a mortgage on joint property
as security for a note executed solely by the other spouse. To give
the debtor-spouse an extension of time on the note without notice to
the spouse signing as surety discharges ordinary sureties from liability
201.
Fla. 478,
202.
203.
Broward
204.
205.
206.

Mann v. Etchells, 132 Fla. 409, 182 So. 198 (1938); Merrill v. Adkins, 131
180 So. 41 (1938).
American Central Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 122 Fla, 363, 165 So. 380 (1936).
Bello v. Union Trust Co., 267 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1959); Gerson v.
Co. Title Co., 116 So. 2d 455 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Powell v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952).
Quick v. Leatherman, 96 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1957).
Montgomery v. Gipson, 69 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1954).
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on the note. But the Florida Court has said that entireties property
can be levied on by the mortgagee, because the obligation remains a
joint debt;2 07 the note is construed merely as evidence of the debt
secured by the mortgage.
Estoppel and Resulting Trusts
It is difficult to tell when the courts will apply the doctrines of
estoppel and resulting trusts. Both are equitable remedies, and ad
hoc adjudication seems to be necessary because of the uncertainty
that has crept into the law through the weighing of equities in individual cases. A summary of the cases, while providing little in the
way of precedent, furnishes some insight into the attitude of the
Florida courts.
It has been held that if a husband and wife convey property
held by the entireties to the brother of the husband by a deed containing a recital of consideration, the transfer cannot be set aside
after the death of the husband upon the ground that the wife received no consideration. 208 A similar ruling prevented a wife, upon
securing a divorce, from attacking the conveyance of her interest in
entireties property to the mother of her former husband. 09 It has
also been said that a payee of a note signed by one of the parties to
a marriage may be able to impose an equitable lien upon entireties
property if the payee can prove fraud or misrepresentation on the
part of the spouse that did not sign the note. 210 In another instance,
equitable estoppel principles were applied to shield innocent purchasers from a woman who upon the records had acquired the fee
to an estate by the entireties by surviving her husband, although
21
in fact she was not legally married to her co-tenant. 1
If the property of other persons is used to purchase property
placed in a tenancy by the entireties, a resulting trust arises in
favor of the persons whose property was so used.212
The foregoing cases emphasize the diversity of holdings that inevitably occurs when the rights of innocent third persons collide with
the traditional concepts that enshroud the tenancy by the entireties.

207. Anderson v. Trueman, 100 Fla. 727, 130 So. 12 (1930).
208. Maxwell v. Sullivan, 123 Fla. 263, 166 So. 575 (1936).
209. Dempsey v. Dempsey, 154 Fla. 728, 19 So. 2d 52 (1944).
210. Yafanaro v. Ninos, 123 So. 2d 286, 288 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960) (dictum).
211. Kerivan v. Fogal, 156 Fla. 92, 22 So. 2d 584 (1945). See also Nottingham
v. Denison, 63 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1953).
212. Wilkins v. Wilkins, 144 Fla. 590, 198 So. 335 (1940) (fiduciary funds used
to purchase entireties property); Brown v. Brown, 123 So. 2d 298 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1960) (spouse used property of children to purchase entireties property).
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These cases cannot even be called typical; similar disputes in cases
1
heretofore discussed were resolved differently. 3
TITLE OPINION PROBLEMS

An attorney checking an abstract of title as the basis for rendering
a title opinion must take into consideration the various pitfalls that
may result from Florida's peculiar tenancy by the entireties. The
following suggestions are not intended to be all-inclusive but are
merely indicative of the problem areas. 214 Many of the defects will
not render the property unmarketable but may, in the absence of
21 5
estoppel, cast a cloud upon title to property. 1
A deed to persons who are in fact man and wife creates a tenancy
by the entireties. A mere recital of marriage is not reliable; there
should be affidavits in the record showing that the husband and
wife were married at the time of the conveyance to them and that
the relationship continued until one of the tenants died.21 6 If they
were not married at the time of the conveyance to them, a subsequent
conveyance or devise by one of the spouses may be effective to convey
only a one-half interest in the property. If they were not married
at the date of death of one of them, the conveyance or devise of
the survivor will be effective only as to half of the property. There
also should be proof in the record of the prior death of the nonconveying spouse. If the other spouse is alive at the time of the
conveyance by the purported survivor, the conveyance is absolutely
217
void and the grantee acquires no interest in the property.
A deed of the fee interest from one spouse to the other, stating
an intent to create a tenancy by the entireties, is sufficient to establish the estate. 21 8 There is some doubt as to whether a conveyance of an undivided one-half interest by one spouse to the
other will create a tenancy by the entireties. There is also doubt as
213. E.g., Richart v. Roper, 156 Fla. 822, 25 So. 2d 80 (1946); Lindsley v.
Phare, 115 Fla. 454, 155 So. 812 (1934); Yafanaro v. Ninos, 123 So. 2d 286 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
214. Case authority for the hypotheticals is omitted, since the statements are
supported by cases cited elsewhere. Reference will be made to Uniform Title
Standards established by The Florida Bar. A title standard is a voluntary agreement by which members of the bar agree to treat a title problem in a particular
manner. A copy of the standards can be found in 20 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp.
1960). The various Florida curative acts, of course, operate with equal vigor
upon property held by the entireties.
215. Uniform Title Standard 00 provides that in construing title problems
the examiner should favor marketability of title whenever possible. 20 FLA. STAT.
ANN. (Supp. 1960).
216. Uniform Title Standard 6.1, 20 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1960).
217. Id., Standard 6.3.
218. Id., Standard 6.1.
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to whether a conveyance of the fee by one spouse to both spouses as
grantees will create an estate by the entireties. In the last two situations, it perhaps would be wise to obtain releases from the heirs of
the non-conveying or the deceased spouse.
If one of the spouses murders the other, the estate by the entireties is severed and a tenancy in common is created. Hence the
murderer or his heirs and the victim's heirs must join to convey the
entire fee.
The wife and the husband must join in the conveyance of the
property in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. Separate deeds
of husband and wife in the presence of the witnesses will not be effective to convey the estate, since the tenancy is considered to be indivisible.210 Although it is believed that a husband's deed will estop
him from asserting any interest against entireties property he alone
conveyed, it would not be safe for an attorney to rely upon the
fact that the wife predeceased the husband and that the afteracquired property of the husband passed under the earlier deed.22
A conveyance of entireties property by one spouse to the other
will vest title to the entireties property in the grantee, even if both
1
spouses did not join as grantors in the deed.221
If the property was homestead at the time of its conversion into
an estate by the entireties, it will pass under the homestead law of
descent rather than to the surviving spouse. In every case in which
the tenants by the entireties used the property as a homestead the
attorney must be particularly careful to check the surrounding facts
and circumstances before determining that the property interest upon
death of one of the spouses vested completely in the surviving spouse.
All divorce decrees in connection with the property in question
should be checked. Failure to mention the property in the decree
results in the parties becoming tenants in common without any right
of survivorship. A sole conveyance thereafter by one of the parties,
even with proof of the death of the co-tenant, raises a red flag.
Although tax deeds are always looked upon with suspicion, a
special word of caution is warranted in regard to entireties property.
The application for a tax deed must have been mailed to each spouse
2 2and in fact received by each spouse. 2
Conveyances directly to her husband of property owned solely
by the wife, with an expression of an intent to create an estate by
219. Id., Standard 6.3.
220. Ibid. But see Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160
So. 745 (1935), in which the Court recognized that at common law a husband's sole
conveyance of entireties property during his wife's lifetime estopped him from
claiming against his grantee after her death.
221. Uniform Title Standard 6.4, 20 FLA. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1960).
222. Montgomery v. Gipson, 69 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1954).
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the entireties, or through a conveyance with the joinder of her husband to a third party and back to the spouses, should be viewed
with caution. Although it is believed that a later conveyance by
the surviving husband would pass the entire fee, it is possible that
the situation might give rise to a resulting trust in favor of the wife's
heirs.
UTILIZATION OF THE TENANCY IN ESTATE PLANNING

The tenancy by the entireties, although it frequently creates tax
problems, can serve some useful purposes in the planning of estates. 2 3
This article does not purport to treat in detail the gift and estate tax
consequences and estate planning aspects of the tenancy but only to
summarize briefly some of its advantages and disadvantages.
The Federal Gift Tax
Personal Property. When personal property owned by one of
the spouses, or purchased by one of them, is placed in their joint
names, a taxable gift has been made.2 24 The value of the gift to the
non-contributing spouse is computed actuarially by the use of life
expectancy tables; the tax is imposed upon the amount of the donor's
contribution to the tenancy less his retained interest in it.225 Thus
the value of the gift will be more than half of the value of the property if the non-contributing spouse is younger than the donor. But
there is no immediate gift tax when the property is composed of bank
accounts or United States savings bonds.226 It is important to remember that termination of the tenancy may result in a gift tax if
the distribution of the proceeds is not in accordance with the actuarial
interests of the spouses in the tenancy. 22 7 A taxable gift also occurs
in the case of termination of or withdrawal by the non-contributing
spouse of savings bonds and bank accounts held by the entireties.22 s
One alleviating factor is that a person who makes a gift to his
spouse need pay a tax on only half of the gift, and he may even
escape this burden if the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion for each
donee and the $30,000 lifetime exclusion have not been exhausted in
229
the year of the gift.
Real Estate. The donor spouse of a gratuitous conveyance of
realty occuring since 1954 is deemed not to have made a gift at the
225. See, e.g., Black, Tenancy by the Entireties as a Tool in Estate Planning
in Florida,5 U. FLA. L. REv. 378 (1952).
224. Commissioner v. Hart, 106 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1939).
225. Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2.
226. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (h) (4).
227. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §2515; Treas. Reg. §25.2515-4 (b).
228. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1 (h) (4).
229. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2503 (b), 2521, 2523.
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time of the transfer. - 3" However, the spouse may elect to have the
transfer treated as a gift. If no election is made, and if the donee
receives any part of the proceeds paid upon termination of the
tenancy for reasons other than death, there will be a gift tax on the
amount received by the donee that is not attributable to the donee's
2 31
contribution to the tenancy.
The Estate Tax
All property that was held by the entireties by a decedent at the
time of his death is deemed to have been his separate property for
estate tax purposes. 23 2 To prevent the entire value of the property
from going into the deceased spouse's gross estate, his personal representative must prove to what extent the property was purchased with
the survivor's separate funds. If the tenancy by the entireties was
created gratuitously by a third person, only the decedent's one half
will be taken into the gross estate; but the personal representative
must show that the property was received from a third party. The fact
that a gift tax has been paid upon the initial transfer is of im233
portance only in claiming a credit against the estate tax.
The cases are in conflict over the possibility of severance of the
tenancy in contemplation of death, but seemingly the harsh effects
of the Internal Revenue Code can be avoided by an irrevocable severance of the tenancy before death.23 4 The cases are also in conflict
as to what will constitute sufficient consideration on the part of the
surviving spouse to avoid dragging the entire value of the tenancy
233
into the decedent's gross estate.
One advantage of holding property by the entireties is that the
property automatically qualifies for the marital deduction to the
extent that its value is included in the gross estate of the deceased
spouse.23 0 The fifty per cent of the adjusted gross estate limitation
on the marital deduction can, however, prevent part of the property
23 7
passing to the surviving spouse from being tax free to the estate.
Florida recognizes the fact that the marital deduction decreases
the tax burden on the estate. Thus, if the value of the wife's dower
and the value of the jointly-held property do not exceed the maximum
230.
231.

232.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §2515 (a).

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2515 (b).
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2040.

233. Hornor's Estate v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1942).
234. See Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949).
235. Compare Estate of Loveland, 13 T.C. 5 (1949), with Estate of Singer v.
Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952).
236. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056 (e) (5).
237. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2056 (c).
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marital deduction, the executor of the deceased spouse's estate cannot hold the wife liable for a portion of the estate tax. 238 But when
a huge artificial estate is taxed in an amount exceeding the testamentary estate and the allowable marital deduction, the estate is
entitled to have the surviving spouse pay part of the tax bill.239
Advantages and Disadvantagesof the Tenancy
Since tenancies by the entireties pass outside the will of the deceased spouse, administration costs upon jointly-held property are
avoided in his estate; but the cost of administration will occur in
the estate of the surviving spouse. Furthermore, the deceased spouse
has lost the control over the ultimate disposition of property that
could have been achieved with a trust. It also appears that property
held by the entireties is not part of the deceased spouse's estate for
either admeasurement or distribution of dower.240
If one spouse desires to leave all of his or her property to the
other spouse and the adjusted gross estate is under $120,000, the
tenancy by the entireties may be the ideal device. In addition, a small
bank account held by the entireties will provide the family with cash
during the period of administration when funds are otherwise inaccessible. Also, in the absence of a fraudulent intent, a spouse can
insulate himself against the claims of his separate creditors by placing
the property in the names of both spouses.
The tenancy can be used to avoid the restrictions placed on the
descent of homestead realty by purchasing the property in the joint
names of the spouses. The life estate in homestead property provided
the wife by the statutes of descent can prove unfortunate, because
she will be unable to convey the interests of the children, who are
remaindermen. Sale of the property is thus very difficult.
Danger areas that spouses should be aware of are the unpleasant
tax consequences that may attend the creation of the tenancy, the
possibility that a spendthrift spouse may waste the estate without
providing properly for minor children, and the always present possibility of severance of the estate by divorce.
CONCLUSION

Any evaluation of the estate by the entireties as it exists in
Florida today must take many factors into account. The critics of
the estate uniformly assert that it is founded upon an anachronistic
doctrine incompatible with modern ideas of American institutions
238.
239.
240.

In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
See Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
See In re Brock's Estate, 63 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1953).
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and that the tenancy is repugnant to the American sense of justice
and the true theory of the marital relationship.
The skeptics also point to the inconsistent results that have been
announced by the Florida Supreme Court. For instance, the Court
in one context says that the tenancy by the entireties does not constitute the separate property of a married woman but in another
context says that it does. The Court has allowed one spouse to act
as agent for the other in transactions concerning personal property
but not in dealings concerning real property.
The Florida Court has announced separate rules covering the
creation of tenancies by the entireties, depending upon whether the
estate is comprised of real or personal property. Divorce and death
are apparently governed by different rules. If the non-contributing
spouse is the wife, the Court presumes a gift of the interest to the
wife; but when the non-contributing spouse is the husband, the
Court presumes the creation of a resulting trust.
The Florida Court in extending protection to the estate against
individual creditors of one of the tenants follows the general Florida
policy of protecting property interests at the expense of creditors.
This, coupled with the homestead laws, dower rights, and freedom
from garnishment of wages, welds a formidable judgment-proof
shield around debtors. It is surprising that there are not more appellate cases in connection with fraudulent transfers, since the estate
by the entireties offers an open door to debtors who desire to thwart
their creditors.
The estate lhy the entireties also defeats the operation of Florida's
constitutional and statutory provisions for the descent of homestead
real estate. In an era in which husbands and wives usually acquire
their homes in their joint names, the interests of surviving children
guaranteed by the Constitution are eliminated by utilization of the
estate. In recognizing that an estate by the entireties can be a homestead for the purpose of exemption from forced sale and yet not descend to the surviving wife as a life estate with a vested remainder in
the children, the Court has probably saved the homestead provisions.
If homestead property could devolve only in the manner provided
by the Constitution, land titles would be tied up during the life of
the wife.
These criticisms seemingly compel a recommendation that the
Florida legislature eliminate the estate by the entireties. However,
there are important considerations that favor retention of the estate
in Florida. The Court has rested its decisions upon a rule of construction based upon a presumption of intention. In America one of
the most prized rights of the individual is control over the property
he owns. If he desires to give his property away he should be able to
do so.
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The Florida Court has announced that it favors community property concepts. This position is laudable because both the husband
and the wife share in the acquisition of property by the family. The
wife's contribution may consist only of keeping the house and
rearing the children, but who is to say that this contribution is not
as important as that of the wage earner? Recognition of the tenancy
by the entireties partially gives effect to the theory of community
property that husband and wife should share equally in property
acquired during coverture.
There are ample legal remedies to prevent fraudulent transfers of
property. Creditors and third persons who deal with real estate held
by the entireties are on notice that both spouses must consent to
alienation of the estate. The Court, because of commercial necessity,
has protected third persons in transactions involving personal property held by the entireties and thereby alleviated hardships that otherwise would arise through the lack of notice of the interests of the
respective spouses.
One of the frequent criticisms leveled at the tenancy is that it
imposes restrictions upon each spouse in severing the estate. Even
if Florida were to abolish the estate by the entireties, the spouses
would not enjoy complete freedom in disposing of real estate during
their joint lives. The husband's joinder would still be required for
a valid conveyance of the wife's real property, and the wife would
still have to release her inchoate dower rights in order to meet the
requirements imposed by cautious vendees. The husband would
still lack power to control the distribution of one third of his realty
and personalty at his death if the wife chose to elect dower.
If the tenancy were abolished, in many instances spouses would
hold property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship unless the
present statutes were amended. They would at least be tenants in
common without the rights of survivorship. Some of the more important consequences would be that creditors could levy upon the
interests of either spouse in non-homestead property, unilateral
alienation of personal property would be permitted, and specific
performance of the husband's individual contracts pertaining to
jointly-held property would be possible.
Regardless of its incongruous features, the fact remains that the
tenancy by the entireties is firmly imbedded in the law of Florida.
A creature of the common law imported initially through judicial
interpretation, the estate has received statutory recognition and has
enjoyed continued expansion since 1913. Although stare decisis
should not control the question of abolishing the tenancy, many
Floridians have relied upon the existence of the tenancy in planning
their estates. Lawyers and laymen are familiar with its general
principles. The cases are inconsistent if the view is taken that only
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one rule must exist for every conceivable situation, but it must be
recognized that if rules are to be instruments of justice there must
be some degree of flexibility.
For these reasons, and since many of the incidents of the estate
would still exist in its absence, abrogation of the estate does not seem
to be warranted. Also it would be inadvisable to deprive the Florida
courts of a legal tool that enables them to reach an equitable result
in divorce cases and in those instances in which the husband has
transferred all or most of his assets to defeat the widow's dower
rights.
There are several changes that may be suggested. First, the Court
should extend the presumption of gift to cover those instances in
which a wife has placed property in the names of herself and her
husband. Although there are historical reasons, there is no logical
reason why the wife should not be allowed to make a gift to her
husband as easily as he can to her. Second, the legislature should
clarify the method by which a spouse owning property can establish
an estate by the entireties. The direct conveyance statute should be
amended to provide that any conveyance from one spouse to another
that expresses an intent to create an estate by the entireties will be
sufficient to create the tenancy. The doubt as to whether the direct
conveyance statute can be utilized to convey to one spouse homestead
property held by the entireties should also be removed.
Third, the courts should clarify the requirements for creating the
estate in personal property. Although it is believed that unambiguous language in an instrument can either create or negate the
tenancy, trial judges and attorneys need guidance in those frequent
situations in which the parties have failed to express themselves
clearly. The wisest choice in regard to bank accounts would be a
rule that the tenancy is not created unless it is expressly provided
for in the depositor's contract with the bank. The surviving spouse's
right to funds remaining in the account could still be protected by a
judicial finding of an intent to create a joint tenancy. This would preclude the surviving spouse from attempting to trace the decedent's
inter vivos transfers. In cases involving personalty other than bank
accounts the intent of the parties should be the touchstone.
Finally, it can safely be predicted that the tenancy by the entireties will remain a pillar of Florida property law. Creditors will
continue to eye enviously but vainly the jewels beyond their grasp.
Children will feel cheated and continue to sue their parents and
stepparents. Husbands will continue to testify that putting property
in the names of both spouses was done only through inadvertence.
And legal scholars will maintain their assault upon that archaic old
English doctrine. But all to no avail!
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